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4 June 1969

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Comments on ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System

1. The Messrs. Chayes and Wiesner and their publishers have done an impressive job of assembling and producing this compilation of articles opposing the proposed Safeguard ABM deployment in the relatively short time available. A number of the chapters are off-the-shelf items which had previously formed the basis for magazine articles or Congressional hearing testimony. However, the editors have come up with a number of new pieces. Some of these, such as Adam Yarmolinsky's chapter on "The Problem of Momentum" in military procurement are more editorial than analytical in content. On the whole, however, the professional quality of the material appears quite high.

2. The principal reference to intelligence and "the threat" come in the opening chapter, "An Overview" and in Carl Kaysen's following chapter, "Defense of the Deterrent." Kaysen points out that Secretary Laird has simply projected the current estimate of Soviet SS-9 deployment at a high rate, with the implicit assumption that they will carry highly accurate MIRVs, in order to reach his conclusion that the Soviets will have a first strike capability in the mid-1970s. He correctly states that no new or greatly revised intelligence estimates were involved. He also discounts Secretary Laird's reference to a possible increase in Soviet ASW capability against the Polaris submarine in the 1970s on the sufficient grounds of Laird's lack of evidence and argumentation."

3. Statements about Soviet offensive and defensive forces appear to be consistent with national estimates, although only open sources, if any, are cited. For example, the force levels given for Soviet

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strategic offensive systems on page 33 appear roughly correct for that time (presumably early spring 1969), and the statements about the SA-5 (Tallinn) system and the Moscow ABM deployment on pages 37, 38, 51, and 56 are in line with current estimates.

4. The chapter "Can the Communists Deceive Us" by Jeremy J. Stone offers an interesting and on the whole correct analysis of US unilateral capability to monitor Soviet weapons, stressing its potential use in verifying arms control agreements. The entire chapter is based on open sources which the author cites in footnotes. Although some of his sources are inaccurate and most are prone to exaggeration to improve their newsworthiness,

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The article is also of interest as an indication of what the Soviets should be concluding about US capabilities on the basis of their scrutiny of "Aviation Week", "US News and World Report", and other standard sources.

5. The major problem areas in development and deployment of ABM defenses defined by the authors correspond to those which have been brought to our attention by US ABM contractors. In particular, the difficulty of designing and programing the computer programs or software for an ABM system is properly emphasized on pages 15, 16, 58, 125, 128, and 129. The related problem of achieving high reliability in large, complex systems also receives deserved attention, as on pages 114, 118, and 119.

6. Costs of Safeguard components given on page 9 are near those we have received from the Safeguard System Office. They appear to be correctly used in the analysis of system costs.

7. The cumulative costs of ABM research and development in the US since 1957 were stated to be about \$4 billion by Senator Kennedy on page XX. We have been given this figure in the past by the Department of Defense and believe it to be the best

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available. On page 3 the authors estimate \$10 billion for total US expenditures on ABM research and development since 1954. No documentation for this figure is offered. Differing criteria for allocation of costs to ABM R&D may account for the higher figure, but we think it is much too high to represent costs properly attributable to the US ABM R&D program.

8. We have not attempted to check out the war gaming calculations, which probably vary in some of their assumptions and conclusions from those used by the DoD in its assessment of the potential threat to Minuteman.